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Abstract—Cybercriminals have been exploiting crypto-
currencies to commit various unique financial frauds. Covert
cryptomining - which is defined as an unauthorized harnessing
of victims’ computational resources to mine cryptocurrencies -
is one of the prevalent ways nowadays used by cybercriminals
to earn financial benefits. Such exploitation of resources causes
financial losses to the victims.
In this paper, we present our novel and efficient approach to
detect covert cryptomining. Our solution is a generic solution
that, unlike currently available solutions to detect covert crypto-
mining, is not tailored to a specific cryptocurrency or a particular
form of cryptomining. In particular, we focus on the core mining
algorithms and utilize Hardware Performance Counters (HPC) to
create clean signatures that grasp the execution pattern of these
algorithms on a processor. We built a complete implementation
of our solution employing advanced machine learning techniques.
We evaluated our methodology on two different processors
through an exhaustive set of experiments. In our experiments, we
considered all the cryptocurrencies mined by the top-10 mining
pools, which collectively represent the largest share (84% during
Q3 2018) of the cryptomining market. Our results show that our
classifier can achieve a near-perfect classification with samples
of length as low as five seconds. Due to its robust and practical
design, our solution can even adapt to zero-day cryptocurrencies.
Finally, we believe our solution is scalable and can be deployed
to tackle the uprising problem of covert cryptomining.
Index Terms—Altcoin, Bitcoin, Crypto, Currency, Machine
learning, Mining, Profiling.
I. INTRODUCTION
CRYPTOMINING, or simply mining, is a process ofvalidating and adding new transaction in the blockchain
digital ledger for various cryptocurrency. It is an essential
process to keep most of the cryptocurrencies running. Typi-
cally, mining is a resource-intensive process that continuously
performs heavy computations. Upon successful mining, miners
receive newly generated cryptocoins as their remuneration.
Usually, newer cryptocurrencies tend to pay a higher reward.
Some cryptocurrencies, such as Monero, make mining fea-
sible on the web-browsers that enable even layman users to
participate in mining.
After the success of Bitcoin [1], several alternative crypto-
currencies (altcoins) have been introduced to the market.
At the time of writing, there are over 2000 active crypto-
currencies [2]. The massive number of cryptocurrencies raises
an enormous demand for mining. This demand continues
to remain huge because mining, as mentioned before, is an
inevitable operation to keep these virtual currency systems
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running. Such an immense demand for mining has attracted
cybercriminals [3, 4] to earn financial gains, who have already
been exploiting cryptocurrencies to perform several types of
financial crimes, e.g., ransomware [5].
Motivation: A genuine miner has to make an investment in
hardware and bear the significant cost of electricity to run the
mining hardware as well as cooling facilities [6]. Nevertheless,
mining is not beneficial on personal expenditure (mainly,
on electricity) unless mining is performed with specialized
hardware [7]. However, mining can be very profitable if it
is performed with “stolen” resources, e.g., through covert
cryptomining, or simply cryptojacking. Cryptojacking is de-
fined as an unauthorized use of the computing resources on a
computer, tablet, mobile phone, or connected home device to
mine cryptocurrencies.
Cybercriminals have made several ingenious attempts to
spread cryptojackers in the form of malware [8], malicious
browser extensions [9], etc. by exploiting vulnerability [10],
compromising third-party plug-ins [11], maneuvering mis-
configurations [12], taking advantage of web-based hosting
service [13], and so on. To evade intrinsic detection techniques
(e.g., processor’s usage), some cryptojackers suspend their
execution when the victim is using the computer [14], use
“pop-under” windows to keep mining for a comparatively
longer duration [15], and utilize legitimate processes of the
operating system to mine [16]. Moreover, merely monitoring
CPU load, etc. is an ineffective strategy because of both false
positives and false negatives [17].
To further aggravate the situation, cryptocurrency mining
service (e.g., Coinhive [18], Crypto-Loot [19]) easily integrate
into websites to monetize the computational power of their
visitors. In fact, cryptojacking attacks exceeded ransomware
attacks in 2018 and affected five times more systems as
compared to ransomware [20]. Such exploitation of the com-
putational resources causes financial damage - primarily in the
form of increased1 electricity bills - to the victims, who often
discover the misuse when the damage has already been done.
Additionally, prolonged mining on an incompatible device
may also damage the hardware [21].
On another side, the current state of cryptomining has
been consuming a vast amount of energy. As a representative
example, Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index was created to
provide insight into this amount with respect to Bitcoin, Bit-
coin network consumes electricity close to the total demand by
Iraq, and a single Bitcoin transaction requires nearly 2.7 times
1A machine consistently performs heavy computations while it does
cryptomining, which, in turn, continuously draws electricity.
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2the electrical energy consumed by 100,000 transactions on
the VISA network [22]. Moreover, a recent study [23] has
suggested that “Bitcoin usage could alone produce enough
CO2 emissions to push warming above 2 ◦C within less than
three decades.” The current situation would further worsen
with illegal/unauthorized/covert cryptomining.
Finally, the abundance of the active cryptocurrencies raises
the demand for a generic solution to detect covert crypto-
mining that does not focus on a particular cryptocurrency.
Contribution: In this paper, we focus on detecting covert
cryptomining. The major contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows:
1) We propose a novel and efficient approach to detect covert
cryptomining. In particular, our approach uses HPC to
profile the core of the mining process, i.e., the mining
algorithms, on a given processor to accurately identify
cryptomining in real-time. We designed our solution to
be a generic one, i.e., it is not tailored to a particular
cryptocurrency or a specific form (e.g., browser-based)
of cryptomining.
2) We exhaustively assess the quality of our proposed
approach. To this end, we designed six different ex-
periments: (1) binary classification; (2) currency clas-
sification; (3) nested classification; (4) sample length;
(5) feature relevance; and (6) unseen miner programs.
For a thorough evaluation of our proposed solution, we
considered eleven distinct cryptocurrencies in our experi-
ments. Our results show that our classifier can accurately
classify cryptomining activities.
3) In the spirit of reproducible research, we make our
collected datasets and the code publicly available2.
Organization: The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. Section II presents a summary of the related
works. We explain our system’s architecture in Section III
and discuss its evaluation in Section IV. Section V addresses
the potential limitations of our proposed solution. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
HPC are special-purpose registers in modern microproces-
sors that count and store hardware-related activities. These
activities are commonly referred to as hardware events3. HPC
are often used to conduct low-level performance analysis
and tuning. HPC-based monitoring has very low-performance
overhead, which makes it suitable even for latency-sensitive
systems. Several works have shown the effectiveness of us-
ing HPC to detect generic malware [24–26], kernel-level
rootkits [27], side-channel attacks [28], unauthorized firmware
modifications [29], etc.
A general-purpose process classification may distinguish
a browser application from a media player or one browser
application from another browser application. In the former
case, the nature of the applications is different while both
the applications in the latter case have the same nature and
2spritz.math.unipd.it/projects/cryptojackers/
3Formally, an event is defined as a countable activity, action, or occur-
rence on a device.
perform the same operation of rendering pages. Cryptominers
have the same nature (of mining), but they essentially perform
very different underlying operations due to different proof-
of-works, and they also require different compute resources
(e.g., BTC mining is processor-oriented while XMR mining
is memory-oriented). Hence, a comparison of our work with
the general-purpose process classification methods falls out of
the scope of this paper.
On another side, there are limited number of works on
detecting cryptomining. Bonneau et al. [30] discuss open re-
search challenges of various cryptocurrencies and their mining.
Huang et al. [31] present a systematic study of Bitcoin mining
malware and have shown that modern botnets tend to do
illegal cryptomining. Eskandari et al. [32] present a survey
of in-browser cryptomining. Other works [17, 33–36] focus
particularly on browser-based mining. However, only a limited
number of cryptocurrencies can be mined in the web-browsers.
MineGuard [37] focuses on detecting cryptomining operations
in the cloud infrastructure.
Our work is different from the state-of-the-art on the follow-
ing dimensions: (1) our proposed solution is a generic solution
that is not tailored to a particular cryptocurrency or a specific
form (e.g., browser-based) of cryptomining on computers; and
(2) we tested our solution against all the cryptocurrencies
mined by the top-10 mining pools, which collectively represent
the largest portion of the cryptomining business.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
We elucidate the key concept behind our approach in Sec-
tion III-A, our data collection phase in Section III-B, selection
of cryptocurrencies Section III-C, and our classifier’s design
in Section III-D.
A. Fundamental intuition of our approach
The task of cryptomining requires a miner to run the
core Proof-of-Work (PoW4) algorithm repetitively to solve the
cryptographic puzzle. At a coarse-grained level, some PoW
algorithms are processor-oriented (e.g., BTC) while some are
memory-oriented (e.g., XMR) due to their underlying design.
At a fine-grained level, each PoW algorithm has its own unique
mathematical/logical computations (or, in other words, the
sequence of operations). Thus, each algorithm upon execution
affects some specific events more as compared to other events
on the processor. Consequently, when an algorithm is executed
several times repetitively, the “more” affected events outnum-
ber the other - relatively under affected - events. It means that a
discernible signature can be built using the relevant events for
a PoW algorithm. As a representative example, Fig. 1 depicts
the variation in events while mining different cryptocurrencies
and performing some common user-tasks. LTC, for instance,
shows a more erratic pattern in cache-misses as compared to
the other events that are affected during LTC mining. On the
other hand, a Skype video call has more disparity in context-
switches.
4We use the term “PoW” to represent different consensus algorithms.
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Fig. 1. A representative example of variation in events while mining different cryptocurrencies and performing some common user-tasks. HPC were polled
every 100ms. The line-points in the graphs do not represent data points and are merely used to make lines distinguishable.
In practice, there is a finite number of PoW algorithms upon
which the cryptocurrencies are established. Thus, we concen-
trate on the mining algorithms instead of individual currency in
our solution. The primary advantage of our approach is that the
signature built for an algorithm would be able to identify even
polymorphic, metamorphic, and heavily obfuscated implemen-
tations of that algorithm because the core PoW algorithm - that
we profile in our solution - remains the same. To this end, we
use supervised machine learning (explained in Section III-D)
to construct signatures and build our classifier.
On another side, an adversary may attempt to circumvent
such signature-based detection in the following ways: (1) by
controlling/limiting the mining; or (2) by neutralizing the
signatures. Limiting the mining would reduce the hashing
rate, which would indeed make the mining less profitable.
Whereas, to neutralize the signatures, the adversary has to
succeed in two main hurdles. First, the adversary must have
to find those computation(s) that only changes those events
that are unrelated to the PoW algorithm. Second, the adversary
must have to run these computation(s) in parallel to the PoW
algorithm, which would again hamper the hashing rate, and
thus the profit.
B. Data collection
To better explain our work, we first describe what data we
collect and how we collect it. We used the perf [38] tool
to profile the processor’s events using HPC. In particular,
we focus on hardware5 events (e.g., branch-misses), soft-
ware6 events (e.g., page-faults), and hardware cache7 events
(e.g., cache-misses) on CPU as the mining processes - de-
pending on their design - require different type of resources.
We profiled each program of both positive (mining) and
negative (non-mining) class individually and collected a total
5Basic events, measured by Performance Monitoring Units (PMU).
6Measurable by kernel counters.
7Data- and instruction-cache hardware events.
50 samples per program. Each sample consists of recordings
of 28 events (described in TABLE I) for 30 seconds with
a sampling rate of 10Hz, which means that each sample
comprises 300 readings of 28 events, i.e., 8400 readings. To
obtain clean signatures: (1) we profiled each program in its
stable stage, i.e., omitting the bootstrapping phase; and (2)
restarted the system to remove any trace of the previous
sample.
For the positive class, we profiled a total of 11 crypto-
currencies discussed in Section III-C. As the representatives of
negative class, we chose: 3D rendering; 7z archive extraction
of tar.gz files; H.264 video encoding of raw video; solving
mqueens problem; Nanoscale Molecular Dynamics (NAMD)
simulation; Netflix movie playback; execution of Random
Forest (RF) machine learning algorithm; Skype video calls;
stress-ng [39] stress test with CPU, memory, I/O, and disk
workers together; playing Team Fortress 2 game; and Visual
Molecular Dynamics (VMD) modeling and visualization. It is
worth mentioning that these user-tasks represent low to high
resource-intensive tasks.
We used two different systems to build our dataset for
the experiments. The configuration of these systems are as
follows: (1) S1, a laptop with an Intel Core i7-7500U @
2.70 GHz (1 socket x 2 cores x 2 threads = 4 logical
compute resources) processor, 8 GB memory, 512 GB SSD
storage, NVIDIA GeForce 940MX 2 GB dedicated graphic
card, Linux kernel 4.14 and (2) S2, a laptop with an Intel
Core i7-8550U @ 1.80 GHz (1 socket x 2 cores x 4 threads
= 8 logical compute resources) processor, 16 GB memory,
512 GB SSD storage, Linux kernel 4.14.
All miner programs and the perf tool were launched in user-
mode. Even though we did not use any system-level privileges,
we believe that using root permissions for defense against
cryptojacking is reasonable. It is worth emphasizing that even
though the dataset has been accumulated in a controlled setup,
our experiments (discussed in Section IV) well simulate real-
world scenario, where samples are collected in the real-time.
4TABLE I
THE events THAT WE MONITOR USING HPC. HERE, HW = HARDWARE,
SW = SOFTWARE, AND HC = HARDWARE CACHE event.
Event Type Description
branch-instructions HW N. of retired branch instructions.
branch-load-misses HW N. of Branch load misses.
branch-loads HW N. of Branch load accesses.
branch-misses HW N. of mispredicted branch instructions.
bus-cycles HW N. of bus cycles, which can be different
from total cycles.
cache-misses HC N. of cache misses.
cache-references HC N. of cache accesses.
context-switches SW N. of context switches.
cpu-migrations SW N. of times the process has migrated.
dTLB-load-misses HC N. of load misses at data TLB.
dTLB-loads HC N. of load hits at data TLB.
dTLB-store-misses HC N. of store misses at data TLB.
dTLB-stores HC N. of store hits at data TLB.
instructions HW N. of retired instructions.
iTLB-load-misses HC N. of instruction fetches that missed
instruction TLB.
iTLB-loads HC N. of instruction fetches that queried
instruction TLB.
L1-dcache-load-misses HC N. of load misses at L1 data cache.
L1-dcache-loads HC N. of loads at L1 data cache.
L1-dcache-stores HC N. of stores at L1 data cache.
LLC-load-misses HC N. of load misses at the last level
cache.
LLC-loads HC N. of loads at the last level cache.
LLC-store-misses HC N. of store misses at the last level
cache.
LLC-stores HC N. of stores at the last level cache.
mem-loads HC N. of memory loads.
mem-stores HC N. of memory stores.
node-load-misses HC N. of load hits at Non-Uniform Mem-
ory Access (NUMA) node.
node-loads HC N. of load misses at NUMA node.
node-store-misses HC N. of store hits at NUMA node.
node-stores HC N. of store misses at NUMA node.
page-faults SW N. of page faults.
ref-cycles HW N. of total cycles; not affected by CPU
frequency scaling.
task-clock SW The clock count specific to the task that
is running.
C. Cryptocurrencies and miners
The probability of solving the cryptographic puzzle during
mining is directly proportional to the miner’s computational
power/resources. Consequently, the miners pool their resources
to combine their hashing power with an aim to consistently
earn a portion of the block reward by solving blocks quickly.
Typically, the mining pools are characterized by their hashing
power. TABLE II shows the top-10 mining pools [40] and the
cryptocurrencies mined by them. At the time writing, these ten
mining pools collectively constitutes the biggest share (84%
during Q3 2018) of the cryptomining business. Please refer
to TABLE B.1 (in Appendix B) for the acronyms and their
corresponding cryptocurrency.
We considered all the cryptocurrencies mentioned in the
TABLE II in our experiments. We used open-source miner
programs to mine these cryptocurrencies. Each miner program
was configured to mine with public mining pools and to utilize
all available the CPUs present on the system. At the time
of our experiments, the miner program for SC was not able
to mine using only the CPU. Hence, we excluded SC from
our experiments. To compensate SC, we included QRK whose
mining algorithm - in contrast to other cryptocurrencies - uses
multiple hashing algorithms. TABLE III shows the mining
algorithm of different cryptocurrencies and the CPU miners
that we used.
TABLE III
MINING ALGORITHM AND CPU MINER FOR DIFFERENT
CRYPTOCURRENCIES
Cryptocurrency Mining algorithm CPU miner
BCD X13 cpuminer-opt 3.8.8.1
BCH, BTC,
SBTC, UBTC SHA-256 cpuminer-multi 1.3.4
BTM Tensority bytom-wallet-desktop 1.0.2
DASH X11 cpuminer-multi 1.3.4
DCR Blake256-r14 cpuminer-multi 1.3.4
ETC, ETH Ethash (ModifiedDagger-Hashimoto) geth 1.7.3
LTC scrypt cpuminer-multi 1.3.4
QRK
BLAKE + Grφstl + Blue
Midnight Wish + JH +
Keccak (SHA-3) + Skein
cpuminer-multi 1.3.4
SC BLAKE2b gominer 0.6
XMC, XMR CryptoNight cpuminer-multi 1.3.4
XZC Lyra2z cpuminer-opt 3.8.8.1
ZEC Equihash Nicehash nheqminer 0.3a
Since our approach focuses on the underlying core PoW al-
gorithm, we considered one currency for every mining algo-
rithm mentioned in TABLE III. We excluded BCH, SBTC,
UBTC, ETC, and XMC in our study. As the proof-of-concept
implementation, we considered only CPU-based miner pro-
grams because each computer has at least one CPU, which
cryptojackers can harness to mine. Nevertheless, our ap-
proach is also valid to distinguish GPU-based miners because
dedicated profiling tools, such as the nvprof [41] tool for
NVIDIA GPUs, allow us to monitor GPU events. Apart from
most of the standard events found on CPUs, GPUs have several
dedicated events that can assist in creating unique signatures
for GPUs.
TABLE II
CRYPTOCURRENCIES MINED BY THE TOP-10 MINING POOLS
N. Mining pool CryptocurrencyBCD BCH BTC BTM DASH DCR ETC ETH LTC SBTC SC UBTC XMC XMR XZC ZEC
1 BTC.com 7 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 7 7
2 AntPool 7 3 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 3
3 ViaBTC 7 3 3 7 3 7 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 3
4 SlushPool 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3
5 F2Pool 7 7 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 7 3 7 3 3 3 3
6 BTC.top 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 Bitclub.network 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 3
8 BTCC 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7
9 BitFury 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
10 BW.com 7 7 3 7 7 7 3 3 3 7 3 3 7 7 7 7
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D. Classifier design
In this section, we elucidate the design of our classification
methodology. Algorithm 1 describes the pipeline of our clas-
sifier.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code for our supervised classification.
1: for each run i from 1 to 10 do
2: Create raw train set and raw test set by 90-10% strat-
ified partitioning.
3: Data preprocessing
• Replace NaN values from raw train set and
raw test set with arithmetic mean of the considered
event.
4: Feature engineering
• train set := Extract feature(raw train set)
• test set := Extract feature(raw test set)
5: Feature scaling
• scaler := StandardScaler()
• scaler.fit(train set) BFit scaler on train set
• scaler.transform(train set)
• scaler.transform(test set)
6: Feature selection
• Compute features’ importance with forests of trees on
train set and select the most relevant features.
7: Training
• Learn the model parameters for the given classifier
(RF/SVM) on the training set using grid search with
5-fold stratified CV.
8: Predict/classify the test set.
9: end for
Our supervised classification algorithm begins with splitting
the base-dataset of 1100 samples (2 classes x 11 instances
x 50 samples) into 90-10% stratified train-test sets, denoted
as raw train set and raw test set. Then, these subsets are
processed as follows:
1) Data preprocessing: The first step of any machine
learning-based classification is to process the raw datasets
to fix any missing value. Since each event we monitor
returns a numerical value, we replace the missing values,
if any, with the arithmetic mean of the respective event.
2) Feature engineering: In this step, we obtain features
that can be used to train a machine learning model for
our prediction problem. Here, we compute 12 statistical
functions (listed in TABLE IV) for every event. This step
converts each sample consisting of 300 readings (rows)
x 28 events (columns) to a single row of 336 (28 events
x 12 features) data-points. The features extracted in this
phase, hereinafter referred to as train set and test set, are
used for the subsequent stages.
TABLE IV
THE STATISTICAL FUNCTIONS THAT WE USED FOR OUR FEATURE
ENGINEERING PHASE
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 quantile 1, 2, and 3 sigma
Arithmetic and geometric mean Kurtosis
Skewness Variance
3) Feature scaling: It is an essential step to eliminate the
influence of large-valued features because features with
larger magnitude can dominate the objective function, and
thus, deterring an estimator to learn from other features
correctly. Hence, we standardize features using standard
scaler, which removes the mean and scale the features to
unit variance.
4) Feature selection: In machine learning, feature selection
or dimensionality reduction is the process of selecting
a subset of relevant features that are used in model
construction. It aims to improve estimators’ accuracy as
well as to boost their performance on high-dimensional
datasets. To do so, we calculate the importance of features
using forests of trees [42] and select the most relevant
features.
5) Training: The training phase consists of learning the
model parameters for the given classifier on the training
set, i.e., train set. Given the nature of the problem, we
resort to supervised machine learning procedures. In par-
ticular, we employed two of the most successful machine
learning methods for classification, namely Random For-
est (RF) [43] and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [44].
For model selection, we use grid search with 5-fold
Cross Validation (CV). The validated hyper-parameters
for RF and SVM are shown in TABLE V and TABLE VI,
respectively. We chose standard range of values for the
hyper-parameters [45].
TABLE V
HYPER-PARAMETERS VALIDATED FOR RF CLASSIFIER
Parameter Validated values Effect on the model
n estimators {10, 25, 50,100, 125, 150} Number of trees use in the ensemble.
max depth [2, ∞) Maximum depth of the trees.
max features ‘auto’, ‘log2’ Number of features to consider whenlooking for the best split.
split criterion gini, entropy Criterion used to split a node in adecision tree.
bootstrap true, false
Bootstrap Aggregation (a.k.a. bagging)
is a technique that reduces model vari-
ances (overfitting) and improves the
outcome of learning on limited sample
or unstable datasets.
random state 10 The seed used by the random numbergenerator.
TABLE VI
HYPER-PARAMETERS VALIDATED FOR SVM CLASSIFIER
Parameter Validated values Effect on the model
kernel ‘rbf’, ‘poly’,‘sigmoid’
Specifies the kernel type to be used in
the algorithm.
C [10−3, 105]
Regularization parameter that controls
the trade-off between the achieving a
low training error and a low testing
error that is the ability to generalize
your classifier to unseen data.
γ
‘auto’,
[10−7, 103]
Shape parameter of the RBF kernel
which defines how an example influ-
ence in the final classification.
degree default=3
Degree of the polynomial kernel func-
tion (‘poly’). Ignored by all other ker-
nels.
random state 10
The seed of the pseudo random number
generator used when shuffling the data
for probability estimates.
66) Prediction: Finally, prediction is made on test set.
The process is repeated ten times for a given experiment and
the final results are computed over these ten runs.
IV. EVALUATION
We throughly evaluated our approach by performing an
exhaustive set of experiments. We performed the following six
different experiments: (1) binary classification; (2) currency
classification; (3) nested classification; (4) sample length;
(5) feature relevance; and (6) unseen miner programs. TA-
BLE VII describes the sample distribution in our base-dataset
for each system, i.e., S1 and S2. Here, sub-classes of the
mining task refer to the cryptocurrencies (discussed in Sec-
tion III-C) while sub-classes of the non-mining task refer to the
actual user-tasks that belong to the negative class (mentioned
in Section III-B). We use the entire base-dataset (1100 samples
per system) for each experiment, unless otherwise stated in an
experiment.
TABLE VII
DATASET: NAME OF THE TASK, SUB-CLASSES PER TASK, SAMPLES PER
SUB-CLASS, AND TOTAL SAMPLES PER TASK FOR EACH SYSTEM
Task Sub-classesper task
Samples per
sub-class
Total samples
per task
Mining 11 50 550
Non-mining 11 50 550
We evaluated our classifier using standard classification
metrics: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1 score. To increase
the statistical significance of our results, we report the mean
and the margin of error for the results with 95% confidence
interval from ten runs of each experiment for each of the
evaluation metric. See Appendix A for details of these eval-
uation metrics and the related statistical terms. We use (·)
indicates the best result for the metric and report the results
as mean ± margin o f error .
A. Binary classification
Our main goal is to identify whether a given instance
represents the mining task or not. Hence, in this experiment,
the label of each sample was defined as the positive or negative
class, accordingly. TABLE VIII presents the results of the
binary classification using both RF and SVM.
TABLE VIII
RESULTS FOR BINARY CLASSIFICATION
System Method Accuracy Precision Recall F1
S1 RF 1.000 ± 0.000· 1.000 ± 0.000· 1.000 ± 0.000· 1.000 ± 0.000·SVM 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002
S2 RF 0.999 ± 0.002· 0.999 ± 0.002· 0.999 ± 0.002· 0.999 ± 0.002·SVM 0.990 ± 0.018 0.991 ± 0.016 0.990 ± 0.018 0.990 ± 0.018
Both the RF and SVM yielded superior performance. How-
ever, RF performed better than SVM on both the system,
i.e., S1 and S2. For the same reason, we report the results
only for RF for the subsequent experiments.
B. Currency classification
The aim of this experiment is to understand the difficulty
level of classification among various cryptocurrencies. There-
fore, the input dataset for this experiment contained instances
only of the cryptocurrencies. TABLE IX lists the results of the
currency classification.
TABLE IX
RESULTS FOR CURRENCY CLASSIFICATION
System Accuracy Precision Recall F1
S1 0.987 ± 0.017 0.992 ± 0.011 0.988 ± 0.016 0.985 ± 0.020
S2 0.986 ± 0.018 0.981 ± 0.027 0.985 ± 0.018 0.982 ± 0.024
Fig. 2 depicts the confusion matrices for the classification
among various cryptocurrencies to provide a better perception
of the results. Here, Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) correspond to
S1 and S2, respectively. The confusion matrices are drawn
using the aggregate results from all the ten runs. Currency
classification is a multi-class classification problem, and some
cryptocurrencies were misclassified among each other (see
Fig. 2). Hence, the results are slightly lower than that of the
binary classification.
(a) S1
(b) S2
Fig. 2. Confusion matrix for classification among various cryptocurrencies
C. Nested classification
This experiment represents a simulation of a real-world sce-
nario. Here, we first classify whether a given instance belongs
to the positive class. If so, we identify the cryptocurrency it
belongs to. Essentially, nested classification is equivalent to
performing currency classification on the instances classified
as positive in the binary classification. Fig. 3 depicts the
hierarchy of nested classification.
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Binary
classification
Currency
classification
if ‘+’ instance
Fig. 3. Hierarchy of nested classification
TABLE X shows the results of the nested classification. In
the worst case, we expect the outcome of this experiment to
be lower than that of the binary classification and currency
classification together because a crucial aspect of such staged
classification is that an error made in the prediction during the
primary stage influences the subsequent stage; the results for
S1 shows this phenomenon. However, in a common scenario,
the expected outcome of this experiment would be between the
results for the binary classification and currency classification;
the results for S2 shows this effect.
TABLE X
RESULTS FOR NESTED CLASSIFICATION
System Accuracy Precision Recall F1
S1 0.973 ± 0.020 0.972 ± 0.026 0.972 ± 0.020 0.967 ± 0.026
S2 0.996 ± 0.007 0.997 ± 0.006 0.996 ± 0.008 0.996 ± 0.008
D. Sample length
The objective of this experiment is to understand the effect
of length of the samples. For deployment in the real-world
scenario, any solution - apart from being accurate - must be
able to detect cryptojackers rapidly. To this end, we performed
the binary classification of samples of a length of 5, 10, 15,
20, 25, and 30 seconds, each in separate experiments. It is
worth mentioning that we used samples of identical length for
both the training and testing. Fig. 4 shows the F1 score when
using samples of different length.
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0.994
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0.998
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S2
Fig. 4. F1 score when using samples of different length (whiskers represent
margin of error)
As explained in Section III-A, the task of mining is to
repeatedly execute the core PoW algorithm. Hence, even
samples of shorter length can grasp the signature. As shown in
Fig. 4, our system can achieve high performance with samples
of 5 seconds. The dip in the curve for S1 corresponds to the
thousandths digit of the F1 score. For the sake of brevity, we
omitted the results for sample shorter than five seconds and
only focus on the required minimum sample length to attain
high performance with our solution.
E. Feature relevance
Next, we focus on our feature selection process (mentioned
in Section III-D). After calculating the importance of features,
we sorted them in ascending order of their importance and
selected the first-Ψ% features to do the binary classification.
Fig. 5 depicts the F1 score when using first-Ψ% features.
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Fig. 5. F1 score when using first-Ψ% features (whiskers represent margin of
error)
Since the features are sorted in the ascending order of their
importance, we begin with the feature with lowest significance.
Intuitively, including important features further improves the
classification process. As shown in the Fig. 5, our classifier
attains high performance on both the systems using only the
first-40% (less relevant) features, which verifies/approves our
feature engineering and selection process.
F. Unseen miner programs
There can be several different miner-programs available
to mine a given cryptocurrency. These programs come from
different developers/sources. Consequently, there can be some
variations in the behavior of the miner-program itself, e.g., in
the code section before/after the PoW function or handling (on
the programming-side) a correct nonce found while mining.
The reason is that they are developed by different developers,
which intuitively will cause variations. Training the model for
each program may not be feasible for a variety of reasons.
Hence, to investigate the effectiveness of our approach in such
a situation, we set up another experiment. Here, we selected
the binary classification as the target where the samples from
all the mining and non-mining tasks were labeled as the
positive or negative class, respectively. However, we chose two
additional miner programs for BTC, namely, BFGMiner 5.5
and cgminer 4.10. We collected additional 50 samples each for
BFGMiner 5.5 and cgminer 4.10 on both S1 and S2 separately.
In the training phase, we used samples from one of the three
miner programs for BTC. On the contrary, we used samples
from one of the other two miner programs for BTC during the
testing phase. TABLE XI presents the results of classifying
samples from the miner programs that were unseen in the
training phase.
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RESULTS FOR UNSEEN MINER PROGRAMS
System Task Accuracy Precision Recall F1
S1
αβ 0.997 ± 0.006 0.997 ± 0.006 0.997 ± 0.006 0.997 ± 0.006
αγ 0.998 ± 0.005 1.000 ± 0.000 0.997 ± 0.006 0.998 ± 0.004
βα 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000
βγ 0.999 ± 0.001 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002
γα 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002
γβ 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000
S2
αβ 0.999 ± 0.001 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002
αγ 0.998 ± 0.002 0.997 ± 0.003 0.997 ± 0.003 0.997 ± 0.003
βα 0.999 ± 0.002 0.998 ± 0.003 0.998 ± 0.003 0.998 ± 0.003
βγ 0.999 ± 0.001 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002
γα 0.999 ± 0.001 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002
γβ 0.999 ± 0.001 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002
The notation XY means that the training was done with
the samples from X while the testing was done with the
sample from Y for BTC. Here, α = cpuminer-multi 1.3.4,
β = BFGMiner 5.5, γ = cgminer 4.10. It is important
to mention that these results are for the classification of all
the mining and non-mining tasks with BTC being trained and
tested upon samples from different programs.
As discussed in Section III-A, the miners have to execute
the same core PoW algorithm for a given cryptocurrency.
Hence, samples from different miner programs for the same
cryptocurrency retain the same signatures, which is reflected
in our results.
V. LIMITATIONS
In this section, we address the potential limitation of our
proposed approach.
A. Zero-day cryptocurrencies
A zero-day cryptocurrency would be a currency that uses a
completely new or custom PoW algorithm that was never seen
before. As a matter of fact, for a cryptocurrency to obtain
market value: (1) its core-network should be supported by
miners/pools; and (2) its PoW algorithm must be accepted
by the crypto-community and tested mathematically for its
robustness. Therefore, the PoW algorithm for a new crypto-
currency would become public by the time it gets ready for
mining, which would give us sufficient time to capture this
new cryptocurrency’s signature and to train our model.
Importantly, miners prefer to mine cryptocurrencies that are
more profitable and avoid hashing the less rewarding ones. As
it happens to be, more profitable cryptocurrencies are indeed
popular and their PoW algorithms are certainly known to the
public. In our experiments, we considered all the popular
cryptocurrencies, and our results (presented in Section IV)
demonstrate the high quality of our proposed approach along
various dimensions.
B. Scalability
The key concept of our approach is to profile the behavior
of a processor’s events for mining algorithms. Since there are
only a finite number of CPUs/GPUs, procuring their signature
is only a matter of data collection. However, it might appear as
a ponderous job and may be seen as a limitation of our work.
But, once it is accomplished for the available CPUs/GPUs,
maintaining it is relatively simpler as merely a limited number
of CPUs/GPUs are released over a period of time.
C. Process selection
As mentioned in Section III-B, our system requires per
program/process-based recording of HPC for different events
as the input to the classifier. In practice, several processes run
in the system. Hence, monitoring each process may consume
time and can be seen as a limitation of our work. However,
as shown in Fig. 4, our system can achieve high performance
even with samples of 5 seconds. On another side, the miner
programs attempt to use all the available resources. Therefore,
an initial sorting/filtering of processes based on their resource
usage can help to boost the detection process in real-time.
D. Restricted mining
A mining strategy to evade detection from our proposed
methodology can be restricted mining that aims to change
the footprint of the mining process. Here, the miner pro-
gram/process can be modified to perform arbitrary operations
during mining. But, such maneuvers would directly affect the
hashing rate and consequently the profits; making the task of
mining less appealing. Nevertheless, like any signature-based
detection technique, it may be seen as a limitation of our work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cybercriminals have developed several proficient ways to
exploit cryptocurrencies with an aim to commit many uncon-
ventional financial frauds. Covert cryptomining is one of the
most recent means to monetize the computational power of the
victims. In this paper, we present our efficient methodology
to identify covert cryptomining. Our solution has a broader
scope as it targets the core PoW algorithms and uses the
low-performance overhead HPC that are present in modern
processors to create discernible signatures. We tested our
generic approach against a set of rigorous experiments that
include eleven distinct cryptocurrencies. We found that our
classifier attains high performance even with short samples
of five seconds. In the future, we will investigate the impact
of samples from different operating system and virtualized
environments. We also hope to release a desktop application
for run-time identification of covert cryptomining
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APPENDIX A
STANDARD DEFINITIONS
Here, we present the definitions of some concepts that we
used in our work.
Standard scaler transforms each feature in such a way
that the mean becomes zero and standard
deviation becomes one. Specifically, given
a feature x and one of its value xi , the
following formula is applied:
Z(xi) = xi − µ(x)
σ(x) ,
where µ(x) and σ(x) are the mean and
standard deviation of the variable x.
Standard error of a variable y is expressed as:
SE (y) = σ(y)√
n
,
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where n and σ(y) are the number of ob-
servations and standard deviation of the
variable y.
Margin of error is the range of values above and below
the sample mean for a given confidence
interval. It is calculated as:
z ∗ SE (y),
where z is the coefficient for the selected
confidence level. E.g., z is 1.96 for 95%
confidence interval.
Accuracy measures how often the classifier makes
the right prediction defined as the ratio
between the number of hit and the number
of predictions.
Precision quantifies the ability of a classifier to not
label a negative example as positive. It is
computed as the ratio of the number of true
positives and the total number of instances
labeled as positives.
Recall defines the probability that a positive pre-
diction made by the classifier is actually
positive. It is computed as the ratio of
the number of true positives and the total
number of positives in the set.
F1 score is a single metric that combines both pre-
cision and recall via their harmonic mean:
F1 score = 2 × precision × recallprecision + recall
APPENDIX B
ACRONYMS
TABLE B.1 describes the acronyms used for different
cryptocurrencies.
TABLE B.1
CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND THEIR ACRONYM
Acronym Cryptocurrency
BCD Bitcoin Diamond
BCH Bitcoin Cash
BTC Bitcoin
BTM Bytom
DASH Dash
DCR Decred
ETC Ethereum Classic
ETH Ethereum
LTC Litecoin
QRK Quark
SBTC SuperBitcoin
SC Siacoin
UBTC UnitedBitcoin
XMC Monero-Classic
XMR Monero
XZC Zcoin
ZEC Zcash
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